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EPISTEME AND DOXA: SOME REFLECTIONS ON ELEATIC AND HERACLITEAN THEMES IN PLATO 
Copy for circulation to The Society for Ancient Greek Philosoph y 
(for December, 1978, meeting) 
Robert G. Turnbull 
The Ohio State University 
1. It is a tru ism of Plato interpretation that Plato wants at once a "worl d" w hich 
is an d a "world" which is and is �· I t is equally truistic that, if he is to 
have those "worlds", he must engage in some rather fancy philosophical footwork. 
Or, to shift the metaphor, Plato must build a philosophical house in which both 
Parmenides and Heraclitus are comfortably accommodated. Since Plato thinks of 
the satisfaction of his wants as requiring of him plausible accounts both of our 
knowledge of laws arid principles·. and also of our perceptual experience (and a 
relating of them), it will help us in understanding both the deaire for two 
"worlds" and Plato's philosophical footwork to attend at. the same time to his 
accounts of episteme and doxa. It is obviously impossible to attempt an ything 
like exhaustive or definitive accounts of either of these matters in the brief 
compass of a single paper. What I wish to point up in the paper are some 
unnoticed features of their interrelationships which help to explain some diff i-
cult texts and which I take to be archai for their definitive accounts. I shall 
assume that Plato's wants are really philosophical desiderata, and it is par t of 
my purpose to show·that he· has means of securing those desiderata which are both 
ingenious and of a piece with"his general patterns of thinking. · Obviously much 
is going to: turn on how; 'is' is to be understood and whether or. not it can be 
said to.· have' different senses� · To give the general·' or·ientation which I think 
necessary for serious discussion of this matter I turn immed iat ely to summarizing 
some interpretation and argument which I published earlier this year .
1 
2. Despite the existence of a number of translations to the contrary, Plato does not 
have in Attic Greek any linguistic distinction corresponding to the English one 
made by 'is' and 'exists'. He is thus spared some of the tortures of late 
medieval and modern philosophy. He do es, howe ver , have a distinction between 
I 
'.. • 
'is' (eimi) and 'comes to be' (gignomai) • Though there is some temptation to 
2 
tarry on the parallels between that:distinction and the one between 'is' and 
'exists', I should like for the time being to ignore 'comes to be' -and attend .to. 
'is'. That the mature Plato (at least) links 'is' to the doctrine of forms is 
beyond question. What is not so universally recognized is that it is less 
illuminating to say, for Plato, that the forms� than it is to say that �be is 
to be a form and, for non-forms, to say that to be is to be informed. This remark .--. - �  
. •  
-----
obviously needs expansion, an expansion which will enable us to make a number of 
important distinctions and clarifications. 
• • 
• 
•. 
! 
'Though I shall. not offer detailed argument ,-here for "the interpretation,. ;.I wish to 
claim "that, :for the mature Plato .(at least), forms ·are principles :of structure. By 
the· use of 'principles'' I wish to.convey ·the ide-a of ·s.tructure itself as .contrasted 
"wlth something (or things) structur�. Thus, the triangle itsel:f, � this golden 
····triangle; the house itself, not this houser courage itself, �courage-in-Achilles. 
Perhaps the primary reason for- so consideri ng. forms is that,· only. by considering them 
· :this· way can .Plato maintain that each form is one or single--and thus fend off the 
attacks-·whioh -are put in t.he mouth of P.armenides in the dialogue of that same name, 
2 
·attacks·o n 'the·uniqueness or singleness of.each form. Any number of things may 
'have the 'same structure. But str ucture itself, just by itself, is, in any given 
.·casef single. With·forms so understood, the·much-dis cussed issue of the "separation" 
(chorisl\lOsl of the forms is simply the issue of the intelligibility of holding that 
there· are.:principles ·Of struct�e just ·by themselves, in "separation" .from. anything 
·structured. ; ·' 
Plato's standard way of referring to a form is by means of expressions like "The!. 
·:·.·· . ·''. ,;· · · ·: ·  . .' ;· 
Itself" (�to. F). And this contrasts with 'This F', 'A certain!_', and so on. 
; : i . '<',.' i 
There is, I think, a striking similarity between this contrast and tha t between 
.. ; 
abstract singular terms (as in 'The triangle has three sides') and individualized 
. ! . ·: •. : � 
singular terms (as in 'This triangle has thr ee sides' or 'This triangle is made of 
gold'). The chief interest lies in the fact that sentences with al:>"stract singulars 
, ·  
3 
. as tpeir subjects entail universal senten9es (as in 'Every triangle has three sides') 
• 
. With proper development of what I take to be the mature Plato's doctrine of 
pa,rticipation. (methexis), Plato has machinery for explaining how it is that, granted 
that The F Itself is §_, if anything can be referred to by 'This F', that thing will 
necessarily be G. There are problems,·of course, in interpreting sentences like 
'The F Itself is G'. 
3 Alexander Nehamas has suggested a way of handling sentences : 
about forms which frees Plato from the morass of self-predication problems. He would 
read 'The !. Itself is !.' as 'The !. Itself is what it is to be F'. Values for 'what 
it is to be !.' will, of course, look like definitions ·as, for example, 'to be G which 
is H' (or'•which!!,'s). Or 'what it is to be G which is H'. On my view, these would 
b e  ways of getting at or talking about principles of structure. And, obviously, 
principles of structure may be internally related in a manner which is perspicuously 
displayed by genera-species orderings. Thus, in the hackneyed example, the 
relatedness of !2_be plane figurate with !2_ be triangular and the identity of The 
Triangle Itself with to be plane figurate �-three sided. Thus, strictly speaking, 
'The F Itself is G' is misbegotten. Provided that one's left hand knows what his 
right hand is doing in so speaking, however;· no harm will be done. 
There are two important consequences of all this for my purposes. First, if what it 
is to be !. includes Q (or to be G or what it is to be§_), then, if anything has a 
share of The F Itself, necessarily (kath auto) it is or has a share of The G Itself. 
In such necessities lies, I believe, the serious applicability of Platonic science 
(episteme) to the world of structured things or, if you please, the world of becoming. 
Second, it is' possible that 'one may.have the linguistic or conceptual means of 
refe
'rring to The F Itself without, by the s.i!mple having of that conceptual means, 
.
. being able to 'articuiat'e or express what it is to tie' !.· though he/she inay have the 
means of so doing somehow "withirl' himself/herself-. ' There : is I . therefore, a clear 
sense �n which one may fin� out or discover, by dint of effort, method, and, perhaps 
.· : . ' . ' 
. 
. 
. { 
n�tive int�lligence, what it is to be F. If one who has knowledge (episteme) is one 
4 
wh o is able to express or articulate what it is to be!. (or whatever) f then his 
knowledge, however "definitional'; it may be, is a dearly. won achievement • .. And it 
is of the forms , not as some sort of peek or gliinpse or ineffable vision of.them, 
but as what, for 'the moment, i: shall call ari ·"articulate awareness" of them.. 
3. 
. 
. Suppose .. forms. to. be p�inpipl es of structure and a.rticulate awareness of them to 
. be d�finitiona1 in character. Whatever it is. that. I am. aware of when I have an 
articulate awareness of The F Itself �when I am aware of �hat i:t is to be F), it 
.must be something �o which spatial �nd tempor'11 pred icates . cannot intelligibly 
be. fip plied. !_'s may .lurk in ce>rners, have .learned geometry, be about to start a 
race, .b,e te n feet ·tall, come. to be,, pass flWay, and so on .. But wh.at it is to be 
!. can har9ly be subj ect to any of these vicissitudes. Indeed, what it is to lur� 
in a corner, what it is to lei!lrn geometry, and so on are eq,ually immune. Since 
it is al;>surd to think that The F Itself or what it is to be F could "become" G 
.� -
or what it is to be� or even.could have "become" The F Itself or what it is to 
. be !_, there would be . no harm in thinking of f9rms as ".eternal" thin951. U, as I 
have claimed, to be is to be a form or, if you pleal:!:e, p r�nciples of s.tructure 
are principles of being, the .''.wo?:ld" which is must })e_the (interrelated) forms. 
And it is that "world" of which we are aware in what I have called "articulate 
awareness" . 
4. We shall return to this matter of def�nitions.an,d articulate awa:t'eness, but I 
should.like.now to turn .rather . .;mruptly :to look .;tt how. "participation" comes out 
' 
. 
. 
. 
. . .  • ' . � . . . ·� ' . ' ' . . . ' . 
. . 
� 
' 
. · 
. . . ·, ' . '' .. 
. on tl;lil9 g�J.leral way o.f ccmst�Q.insr Pltatp. On that way, i� seems obvious that, if 
. : ' . ,'; . . , ; :  . . . - . 
anythinq. were t.o have a share of. .(metech.ein) �f a . fqrm (qll:a pri�c:i,.ple. of 
st.rupt\lr�), (a). it we>uld, not itself be a principle of structure, (b) it would be, 
• . . I . ' , . 
,' • � . . • • - , '. •. • 
.  "qua l:lav:i,n<J: a "share" r struct�red., and (c) .tt would not have the. form as a part 
. (eitb�r nume::i:ica;t.ly or specific�lly),. 
ca'> is based, of course, on the ide� of the work which having !. sha're or 
. � ' 
participating is to do for Plato. And that work is to provide. an inteliic;iible 
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frame for various tl,1ings' being!_, �, or whatever as contrasted with being what it 
is to be F, G, or whatever. On �his view, to be !. is to be structured in a certain 
way--the F way. Thus 'has a share' (metechei) becomes a technical Platonic term for 
explaining one of the meanings of 'is' in standar d usage, vtz., that in such sentences 
as 'This man is tall', 'This triangle is made of gold', and the like. This meaning 
of 'is', unlike that in sentences about forms, admits of tensed usage. It makes 
perfect sense· to say that something' had a share of.The F Itself or that it !!.!!_ � 
a share of The F Itself. (Though, ·as we have noted, no sense can be attached to 
saying that The F Itself was or will be what it is to be !:_.) I ·hasten to note that, 
on the interpretation I am pressing for, having !. share is not limited to what is 
expressed by predicates or verbs, as even brief reflection on the difference between 
The F Itself and This F will show. In the participational use of 'is', a structured 
thing is said to have (have had, be about to have) some other or some contained or 
subordinate structure. And Plato, in Parmenides, makes a point of the need for having 
a share of � � or The � Itself, where � This Itself is, as it were, a 
syncategorematic form. More will be said on this score later in commenting briefly 
on soma passages in Parmenides and Sophist. 
With regard to ( c), it is worth underlining the point that things which have a common 
structure do not have a common part either numerically (as adjacent room s  have a wall 
in common) or specifically (as bronze contains tin). Yet it is perfectly sensible to 
say that ce rtain houses, automobiles, statues, triangles, or whatever all have the 
same structure. Indeed, we commonly say that they are the same house, same -. 
automobile, and so on. To add a bit to (c), we may note that Plato is an atornist, 
with tetrahedral, cubical, octahedral, and icosahedral atoms (omitting, for the 
present purpose,.their t:onstruction from triangles).' Basic materials (earth, air, 
fire, 'and water) 'thus' share· structures, and mixtUres of· 'them share . (mathematical) 
structures. !nde�d, withbut stra.ihintj the· use· of ·•mathematical•·,· one may· say that 
Plato's material world, just insofar as it is at all, is through and through 
. s. 
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mathematically structured. Thus anything in it which .!!!. at all !!. by virtue of 
having a share �f some structure o� other, i.e., by h0aving a share of a form. 
This si�ly fleshes ��t ;.� 
:
bit w�t I claimed early in' the pa°per, viz., that, 
for non-forms, to be is to be informed. 
-----
:;\.:;"''.\.· . ' '  . 
All. this requires obviously that. the "wo;rid'.', t;>f structured thing� .have--at 
. ... . . .  � 
·bottom, as it were--non-something which, ,in itself, cannot be said. to. "be" at all. 
·.As Plato puts it, since. proper. ,;nqui:r;y can only, get �t things which � �.ither in 
the articulation of principles .sense . or i� the participational. s:en,se, non-
4 something . can be apprehend�d only by a kj,nd. .. o.f "l:>a�ta,rd reasc;ming" • . By �uch 
"bastard reasoning", one may .i;;ay :that "it'': (non"'.'S01llethi1u1) takes, accepts, or 
admits structure but, .. in ,0itself" neither is nor has s.�ruct'l;u::e. In tjlis. respect, 
:"it", as been often noted, is .like,the so-called prime matter of Aristotle. And 
· . neither Plato's "receptacle" nor Aristotle's prime matter. is ever to be found in 
its "natural" condition. What we always find.is (participationally is) something 
-
. . · ·  . 
..-. 
·or :other, . .!.•!:.•r is in some manner 1:?tructµred. In Plato's case, bedrock seems to 
. : • ! ' 
' . . 
the structuring given·the :,:eceptacle by the d��l,lrge·as the �lemeritary atoms-of 
earth, air, fire, and water (or, if:y.ou please,; el,ementa:i;y triangl�s). The 
reasoning (logismos) which gets us to the "receptacle", the non-something, is 
"bastard" (nothos) because, as Timaeus puts it, it is without the.aid of 
sensation (anaisthesis) and is "irrational" (al�gosL5 Properly parented 
.: ' ·  · . •.'\ , . .  
reasoning or apprehension gets us at lea�t to something which is, whether-in the 
: : : . .. . ,· ,, •• I •: • • •  :· • ';• ' ,  • ' ·, • 
structure itself sense or in the participational sense. In context Plato 
:··� i�. 
' : . · .. - . . '; : ' .. .  ! 
suggests tha"t' the requirement of the receptacle is ail �ne with th� 'requirement 
tha t there "be" space (chora) or place • 
. ' 
·.So much ,for t;he arena of .. partic.ipation, mul:t�plicity,, and, change • .  I. am quite 
. .· . . ' ... 
·.··.aware prope r disc�ssion � this difficu,J,.t par;t, of. the Timae�us �ould. require the 
6 .·:'so.rt. of .treatment gi'(�n i�. by, say, Edwa.rd .L.ee,. wh��ein pr"-per atten.tion is giver 
. . � . � ; 
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to random movements, the so-called 'errant cause', the images of nurse and 
mother, and so on. 
6. It seems clear enough that, with the conception of forms as p�inciples o� struc-
ture, "something" may have a certain structure, F, at one time and have, i,�stead, 
a different structure, g, at a later time (where F .and G are contraries). Given 
the notion of contrariety which is in Plato as early as Phaedo, we may then say 
that it is !. at a certain time, and, later, is �F. ·This 'not' I would 
.. 
understand as Sophist suggests, that is, reading the 'is not !'..' as 'has a share 
of one of the parts of Different, �., the Different from F'. 
I have intentionally left out any definite s.ubject terII\ (or term filler) in the 
above paragraph,_,but now I wis"tl to return. to an idea of 4. above, namely, that 
of having a share. of the this,. an idea which is obviously linked with the usage, 
'This !.', to refer _E2 something, �s contrasted with saying something about an 
object or thing referred to. Obviously, in order to refer successfully, there 
must be something referred to. By which I mean not simply that there must be some 
structur� thing but also that the ,subject term be one which could be used to 
refer to a princip+e of structure or form. Put in terms used in Sophist, there 
(.� 
has to be a being to be "said".. (J;3ut I shall say a bit more about this "saying 
beings" matter l_ater in the pape�). Though_ Socrates, in Parmenides, 7 is made to 
express .doubt about how to handle "substance" formi;;.1 for example, �' �' fire, 
and so on,. and the idea.of the�r having shares, much later.in the same dialogue
8 
Plato .. suggests .the idea of having a share of �-this and also the idea ,that 
something might remain the same while going through a process of change. Put in 
the terms of this paper, something could be structured in a certain way through 
. .  
. 
. 
' 
. 
_ · 
·
,·, 
. . . . . 
a stretch of time during which other sorts of structuring of it were changing. 
' ' . ' " :' : � 
The obvious sort of illustration of this is, of course, the "substance" sort, 
' .. 
. 
' 
' ' ' . ,. ·' 
.
. 
, 
. 
' 
. 
. 
; 
··� ' 
for example, something's remaining a man while getting larger or smaller, 
''1-- . 
�ha.hgin'g locat
'
ion, atld ·so on. 
� ::: . : ,; · .. ·. . - ... ' . ' '.! .·) 
In Parmenides terms, remaining in one respect 
' '  
i: 
a 
"in the same" while, in another, being (for the stretch of time involved) "always in 
a different". Thus there does seem to be a straightforward case to be ma.de for 
sayi.ng that certain structtir� 'things , notmally' gotten at by subject terms,·. both 
are and are not in the sense of ri�w havirtg a share of The F Itself and,. later, - -- -
·
having a sh�e of The G Itself, where .F arid Gare contraries. 
9 In his reply to Zeno in the early part of Parmenides, . Socrates calls a ttention to 
a sense in which he, Socrate� � mal' both� and . . not �' when he p oints out that he 
ma.y have a share both of The One xtsel� (as being one man) and The Many Itself (as 
having many parts) at one and the same time. I am not quite confident about the 
general manne r of handiing relatives, that is, the kind of relatives which allow one 
t.o say misleadingly that s�methinq is, for example , both iarge and small at the 
same time. I think that Plato•·s line, in Phaedo10 and elsewhere (for example, in 
the SlavejMaster . · part of Parmenides) is that something structured· may be properly 
called iar.ge only relative to something which (in regard to the first thing) may be 
called small. And even the form The Larqe Itself is· .2!. The Small Itself, in the 
same way that The Master Itseif (in the Parmenides case) is 2!_ The. slave Itself. 
We ·are not, of cours'e, to think of these relatives as suggestin91that Plato has any 
such doctrine.as that· made possible by the apparatus of, say, Principia Mathematica 
and exploitedby Russell and others with'the'idea that relations are simply !!.-adic 
functibns where !!. is greater thar(1. ·Plat�� s idea '<as well as Aristotle ts11> is 
simply that c�rtai� - terms may''be.-applied to things only if certain others. (their 
.• : · . .  
correlatives) may also ·be applied�'' They are in that sense 2£. each ()thet�' 
· 
�t may be worth. paus.ing on a cor.relative matter which is not often attended to in 
. .  
• ,  
.Plato di�pussions, b�t is� '?-n obvious feature of Aristotle's discussion of pros .:!:.!, in 
Cate,gories. Sensati�:m.,<aisthesis) is of the. sensed or sensible and. is thus a pros £ 
•: . 
. 
:
• .·_ 
.
. 
,: .. 
term like .double, fa���:r:,. +ar9�, and,, so on. There is a special bearing here for our .... ' ·  
... disc:ussion of i.s and is no:t .in that, ·.····. 
�
· 
� ·--.· ',, 
12 in t.he Theaetetus treatment of aisthesis, 
7. 
9 
the sensed (in the.sense· of th� ·sensed tliin'c;J).may be the saine' in· two ciases in 
which th·� aisthesis is different. l . Thus the same wine �ay· be, for Socrates. well, 
sweet and, for'socrates ill, sour. or the same wind �ay ·b�, for one person, 
colc:i" and, for another warm. 'Be• is, of course, niisleading, but, in context, 
Socrates is giving Protagoras a run for his money and only' later points out 
that fully fledged perceptual apprehensio� involves the soul's using the sense 
organs or the sensations as proper ·instr�nts for apprehending things in the 
material world. I mention the.whole matter only in passing and only for the 
sake of adding another dimension to the. dis.cussion of �and is not, a dimension 
we shall make some use of shortly. For, ·if Protagoras were to be believed, one 
and the same thing could be both F and not !_.without undergoing a process of 
change. 
: 13 As everyone knows, in Republic y_, Plato links doxa with is and .!!. �and 
links episteme with is. (And he links agnoia with �riot.) Doxa as used here 
and elsewhere (though not uniformly) is some ·so�t of propensity or settled 
disposition, indeed, a many-track dispositiori .. or propensity. I may have� 
in regard to ·many differe nt parts of what is arid !,:!. not • .  Given what we have 
been saying about is and is not, it would seem that there could be doxa (now 
used ·as an occurrent ·term) in regard. to a particular horse , the sun, an action, 
or what have you.· In Republic y_ �is also linked wi,th sights and sounds and, 
if I may so us e words, the doxast.i.c per.son. is characte�ized as typically a 
"lover of sights and. s"ounds." And the doxastic person is contrasted with the 
� '':. 
. 
epistemic person, the latter being. given the name i philosopher I Or 1 lOVer Of 
wisdom'. 
' 
. 
. . 
. 
. 
' 
, 
� 
. 
: 
. ). . 
·. ; � . . 
As such the epistemic person has an abiiity· (dynamis) 'or set of 
· . .  abiiities �hich are connected �ith is or .. W:ith the fo�m$. In contrast with the 
.· ·; doiastic 'Pei�o�, the love'r 'of sights and so�d·s, who. 'i� �har�ct�:d.zed a's 'asleep 
·.,
,_, t ·, 
10 
. At �Y other points Plato associates .doxa with persuasion. The doxastic person is ··. 
:
:
:
· 
. . 
' ' ' 
. .
. 
�
-
.
.
. 
· .
· 
-
· :  ' . 
fair_ qame for the. orator or sophist • . Doxa, as something believed or opined, is 
• .  - ' ' · ... .. .. : : .. · _:).; • .  _· . :· .
· 
. . •. � • . > .
.
.. 
: 
. •  
: 
' · .
. 
· .
. 
something which one can be persuaded into, be persuaded to deny, or be persuaded to 
·
. 
. • 
. 
·· - ·  
·, • _.j'' .- •. .. . . • . . . '" -:· ,_ . ' 
amend .or chan.ge. P.lato also associates persuasion with pleasure and pain,. 
and he 
; 
. 
. 
� 
.
. 
. 
. 
. 
. . 
. 
. 
. . ; .. , 
associates both with aisthesis. The linkage with pleasure an d pain is, I be lieve, 
· . 
. 
·
-
..
.. 
. .. . . 
' 
. .. 
to be found i� ,�. doctr:ine to th,e ef fee� ,that h�. beings tend to �av� doxai 
appropriate to what they associate with pleasure (or the avoidance of pain) or what 
. ' ' ' 
" 
: 
� . ' ;_· . _.· ' : :· ·.: - . ... . 
.. 
; 
: 
. 
. .· 
'. 
' 
. 
. . , . .. . . . · . .. : ·. ; 
. 
. . 
' ' 
. . . 
�� ��self.pleasural:!le. � key theme i� Gor�ias
14 
is that, even as a cook panders to 
people's palates and not to.their constitutions, so the orator panders to what it 
. , . 
. 
. 
. . • . 
. . ; . •· <:·.: .}. . .·· . . 
. 
pleases people .. to believe rather than what is for their good or will make them good. :·l'.(:;·1 
But doxai seem·1inked with sensation (aisthesis) as well insofar as the latter is 
caused by or is of the material world via our senses. Thus the doxastic person 
as attached to sights and sounds. In.the celebrated analogy of the line in 
• , ' . , , : .• . :'- • •  
.
' ·\.L,- " 
• 
; 
• 
',· 
Republic ,Y!_,15 � �s taken_ to en�ompass both eikasia and E,istis. The former 
. ' .
. 
. , ; 
being ,s()me sort of naive percept.ual acceptance suggestin� th� state of mind of 
sorneon� taken in by "shad()W pa���;z:igs", �·!:., pain-t:-ings involving bot� perspective 
and tpe use of shadows to suggest three-dimensionality. The eikastic person 
' • • 
-
' • ' ':' • • • v � • • • ' • � " • • J ' ,. ' • • .. • : � : • • • , ; • ' • ' • 
. seeming to be. a prime candidate to be the. "lover of sights and sounds" whose 
. : 
. 
. . 
' . . .. � . ' .. ' . . . 
·
_. 
·
. 
.. 
. . i_: ;' 
: . ' 
: 
. 
. 
' ' ' ' : ... . . . . �- : . ·. .. : ' 
attachment to the sight� and sounds of naive perce�tual consciousn�ss is ,
rather 
like the dreamer's attachment to his dreams. Pistis seems rather more the ' . . . . . .. : � . ··. . ; '• . . 
con.��<;lent state of mind of somec;>ne who kno��. hi�/her way around and is i:io7 taken 
. 
in by
_�r� appearance�. '.l'he_pistic person ;s, .as Plato w ould have it, someone . . . . , ' . ·
·
·' . , ' . . . . . 
·
. . . . . : '.: .. : . : . .,. . .. . .. . ; . ' �. . 
aware of the ca����' �f. �he. ,"o�je9'-s'� e>f .. 
e
.
ikasia. Aild this interpretatioi: of him/ 
her is pretty w�ll borne out by the clarification provided by the cave. He/she is 
• .  - i',- .- . :
. 
:···'. 
.
.
.
. 
/ \ 
.
. ' . •
. 
� �·: .·: ' ·  ·',.: 
.  • . 
' :·· 
.
: 
.· � . . : 
' 
.
. .
" .·
.� 
• 
the relea�ed.pri$oner.�ookin9 at the (comparatively) "real" Qbj�cts in all three 
. . . . . 
. · .. ' ' . . . . . . . . ' . � ' ·_. ' ·: . ' ' : : . . . : . . � . : ' . : . . 
. ,,. dime�sio,�s.� �e�;ri� '.carri�d .. 
alon9
: 
the, Pa,r�p�� !-
�ut .
. 
both the eikastic and the pistic 
persons are.�ttendin9 to. the "world" which is and is not • 
• . : • ., .· . ·· . •  . • •  �· !' . . ' • · · . · .• ·.·
·
.-.�.' 
.
:.
: 
;:. ' ·. t:: : .� . , \·� .. �·.· \ • "! ' 
i.l 
8. I should like now to shift the _
scene rather abruptly in the inte1'e.st �� getti ng 
before us some not-always-noticed features of the do�stic sto1:y, features which 
I think, . .  qre ii:nPortant as well to tbe epistemic. story and to th.e "wo?:"1d" which 
is. However we a.re to .characterize do� exactly, it is quite clear that doxa 
� 
,
. 
, 
• ,
-
• 
' ' • : . • _ ___,,_. ,  • •  ' -c. 
_ , , 
• 
• 
•
• -
is expressed linguisticall� •, l �ope, starting wit h this near�truism, to get a 
, ' ' 
' 
. 
. � 
. . 
. 
rather sweeping claim c:oncern_ing Plato's theor,Y of and reliance upon la nguage 
o.n the table. In doing so, I sha ll make rather liberal use of a published paper 
of my former student, Jeffrey Gol d,
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.and shall pe articulating so�e features of 
some conversations I have _had with him c oncerning Plato's Cratylus. 
Cratylus make s a great deal of a mythical name-giver who provides us with 
"conventional" linguistic resources which are ta ilored to a remarkable set of 
Platonic forms, namely, Name forms. And Cratylus suggests that quite different 
conventional linguistic resource s  c ould be and are tailored to that same set of 
forms, so tha t there could be and are the same names in quite different 
conventional languages. Since the Name forms which the name-giver loo ks to are 
linked with the remaining forms (in the pros ti.or "of" sen�e discussed in 6.), 
- ·  
--
we may p+esumably be sure that the conventional_ names provided by the name-giver 
are o r  can be linked with those .rei;naining forms and/or shaJ.:e.s of them. In 
accordance with the scheme outlined eariier in this paper, name forms are 
principles of structure, and s��res of them (the structureds) would seem to be 
structur� patterns of speech qua dispositions manifested in overt and covert 
utterances o f  the co11.ventiona� �s given ty the name-giver. Thus, at least in 
communi.ties blessed with appropriate conventional languages, toddlers, in 
learning to speak their native tongue, a.re beirig provided;wit.h th!lir chief means 
of apprehe nding P,latonic fo�i;;, though tl'ie .�1;:ic�ate, ac t�al apprel\en�io� of them 
wil,l t?e a dearly won achievement, anq, s��tis�ic;::al_ly �peaking, ;they are not 
likely to ac.bieve i:t. 
' .  
. 
. 
·�: 
' .� 
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They are also being provided with.the linguistic means of expressing doxa, 
indeed with their chief" rite�s of appreh�ns ion of' 'the 'n:.any structur� things 
around them. The linkage of this �se of,lang�ge �ith aisthesis seems obvious 
enough. 
. ! . ,  ' ' .
, 
. i ' . ' . 
• . . ' • .  . . 
When in the presence of· an F-thing, the ·child is conditioned to say or 
• ,I J;,• ; 
· "' ' 
' ' •·_ .. ·, \' .•· 
_• ,t • :  . ' ' •  , ' . •, 
utter, 'F'. And there are, of cou£$-e, 'any nuniber of vaiues of '!,' which can be 
simiiclriy linked with sensationor aisthei;is 'situations. if one Were to speak 
. "f 
of deveiopm�ntai stages, this ·,�ppears· 'to be ari ideal candidate for the staqe of 
eikasi.a: and the' cath�xi.s on �-iqht.s1 and ·sounds. But; of course, the name-9iver 
has CJi Ven 
.
. US �; t�iCh 'enOU�� �CabUlary tO exp:re'ss the learning I . SC). tO . Spe8k I that 
.: ' . .  
things have·other sides than the.facing side; that receding things look' smaller, 
that the same. thing can be tquched and seen, and so on. Still that vocabulary 
. ' .  ' .- . . • . 
' ! • . 
is acquired and expressed in link�ge with aisthesis • .  And, even though.9.ne by its 
acquisition and em�loyment �eaches the stage of pistiE!, the familiaX: e>bj.ects of 
the do�stic man are the st:r;uctured objects �f the "world" which, on Plato's 
v��w, is and is �· 'i· . 
9. The moral of the tale for.Piat�'s doctrine of doxa is the idea that, in 
' . , ' . 
acquiring a native language, one acquires it virtualiy entirely in a � (or, 
if you please, object language) context and/ given the associations· with 
aisth�sis, inevitabiy comes to the "acceptartbe" of the objects.of aisthesis as 
"real". A c�nsequence of this sort of "ac'ceptance" is that� unreilectively, 
• ; .: . . .• ,i : ; ; . - . .�-- . • 
. 
: 
. 
\
, 
. 
• 
.. : - : ' . . • ·::. ·; 
. 
. • . . : 
. . . : . . • 
one looks for "causes" and lliterconnections i>etween the structured things in 
those �li.tngs·. Put e�e� �re crudeiy> one, �-t least at' .:ff.i�t; b�comeis '�r 
. : ' ; '. t �:' . "•, .'. ... ·.·· ;· �-· ' ·.... . : . ' :: .. ·: .. . . • \ .. : ' :."\ • . .:.":. . • .i . .  ; • . • .. ' ' .. • . : . . ·:i: . ·: .' naturally is an empiric. Add pleasure and pain to this--as obvious· features of 
. �he li���� with aisthe�.iX�:..�rid: one ��n· begin to discern- pr�tty1' c 1eariy the 
�ssociati�� ; �f d�xa with ·piJsuas.ion. Though the naire;..giver may have,'been a 
gr�a:t:b��efa�·to�> his; �reflective-;benefici�ries� conscious of' a i•world11 of 
thlng�-o�l� by(the ass��.iati�e tie -�f nameswiththirigs .'iri� aisthesis contexts, 
are rather easily moved by orators, especially under'tlie infiuence· of pleasure 
13 
or pain, to loosen linguistic ties and be led into associations not intended by 
the name-giver. The rather touching speech of Socra�es in Pha�do,17 urging his 
followers not to become misologists, even if he (Socrates) fails to produce a 
certain argument, assumes a new significance when seen against this kind of 
background. As I shall try to show shortly, the search for genuine knowledge, as 
Plato sees it, is in a tough sense logistic. Plato sees its alternative as a 
return to knacks, routines, and loose association, the sort of thing dealt with 
h. i . 18 so scat ingly n Gorgias. 
9. But let me put the matter a bit differently and bring back the forms-as-being 
theme. Plato clearly thinks that all of the· being and, as well, the interconnec-
tions of things in the world of becoming consist in their being shares of the 
wo rld of forms, i.!:_., in the terms o f this paper, things having structure for 
which the forms are the principles. Cratylus claims that there are name forms, 
these, in the present view, being principles of structure which parallel the 
; , 
other forms (being of them) and which are properly embodied in or enstructured 
in linguistic habits and dispositions. The Cratylus fiction of the name-giver is 
that of an omniscient ancestor who has provided us with a sufficiently articulatec 
set of sounds (and marks) to be the material tokens for linguistic dispositions 
which are or can embody the structures which name forms are. Young children, as 
noted before, acquire the linguistic dispositions of the name-giver in contexts 
involving aisthesis (at least the first ones). Enamored.by the sights and sounds 
and suffering from the illusion that:t:i:uth is to be found in the objects of 
perception,' they fix their· attention on what they ·are conscious of PY way of t he 
sights and sounds. 
If they are lucky, they will encounter a Socrates who will invite them to turn 
away from the sights and sounds, from the !_'s and.�'s, and try to state what it 
.•
. 
. 
. .. 
. . 
is to be F, what it is to be G, and so on. For this purpose the sights and soundE 
-
. 
-
.- ·• 
are hindrances; what is needed is attention to the linguistic dispositions by 
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means of which (with aisthesis ) they see things. From what has been said in 
. 
. .  ,·: . 
' '  
the fo�egoin9, it should be clear that, on the view here being outlined, the 
inquiry is in a sense lingu istic and in .another sense �· Interestingly, if 
one . we re to collect texts of Plato in wbich he is talking about the forms and 
' 
. 
the investigation of them, he/she would collect a very large number of uses of 
linguist ic or linguistic-associated terms. Typically: 'Logos' ( especially in 
. .. .. . . . 
uses c ommonly translated by 'reason'), 'Dialect ike', and 'Dialegesthai' • 
. . '' . ' 
., . . 
.
:--;. 
.. 
. 
. 
. 
Illustrat ive and typical of several texts is Parmenides• remark to the young 
' 
" 
Socrates: "When you were just now speaking to hiin [Zerio], I was impressed that 
you did not stay simply with visibles nor l�t your review:wander .about 
concerning them, but rather concerningtho?e which one grasps simply by logo s 
an d must be thought of as forms (eid�) • 1119 
, . 
In the above paragraph I said something about "attention to the linguistic 
dispositions • • •  " This is, of course, misle ading . Explaining how it is 
misleading wi ll help unpack my remark about the inquiry's being both linguistic 
' .  
and non-linguistic and will, I think, be best don e by making some comments about 
. .  
object and metaaanguages. 
10. We have all grown �P 011 .. <th.e . d;stiz:iqt;on. between object language .and . meta languag e . 
�g most. of us havE!i: dif:1covered .t-Jl�t it is .deceptivE!lY �imple. In .,pa:t;ticular, it 
. does n ot .. help. us to.·unqer!3tand .. }).ow . �my  �or�. of.: lan9ua9e .l\lElnag�s 
.
. to '.be .aPout 
dlnyth;i;ng,, apd ;i.t doe s.1pot help. apd ·�Y. :hinde� 
.
. 
O\Jr abfli�y .fo;- _ll\aki,ng.· som� 
disti,nctions whi9h,_are crucial for., !30pl;li,::;t.i,cat:ed •.t a�� apout ;Lang�ge. The 
cratylus' name-.gi;ver. wpul.d ·haye. plqyed ,a poor jolte j.ndeed if all, he h�d 
bequ eathed future language-users were the conditioning of them to utter some 
sounds and sound-sequences without providing for the linkage of them with 
. 
.. 
•• � : 
• < ' • ' • 
aisthesis and their linkage, as well, with any number of activities necessary 
. ,. 
for the accomp lishment of tasks, including those of the state or polis. Without 
that linkage, there would hardly be a language . And, unless that linkage meshed, 
: 
.
: 
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as one says, .with the way ;the world is, there would be, to put it mildly, a gre at 
deal.of trouble. The name'.'"giver has to be a remarkable man indeed, who provides the 
means of inducing in his languag e users a set of dispositions and propensities, 
linked with his conventional marks and noises, which are structured embodiments of 
the name-forms. The name-f�rms � in tum, being of the other forms--in all the ir 
interconnectedness--reflect them and would, presumably, have to be in some way 
isomorph ic with them. The point I am working towards, of course, is that, given all 
this, there would be a reason for saying that some appropriate sort of reflection 
upon or use of language would giv e one a gri p on the forms, the principles of 
structure, or, if you please, bein9. 
Before amplifyi.ng upon that.point, it may be worth noting that, in stressing the 
linkage ·Of "names" with aisthesis in language learning, I have failed to stress the 
linkage of terms with on e .another which.would have to be part of the name-giver's 
patrimony. If the name-giver has done his job w ell, his conventional sounds (and 
marks) will include the panoply of particles, nouns, verbs, inflections, conjugations, 
singulars, plurals, etc. neces.i;ary to get the job done. Here, the analogy, in 
20 Cratylus, of the shuttle-maker to the name-giver has bite. Plato goes to some 
lengths to require that the shuttle in any given case be the proper sort of shuttle 
to get a particular job with a particular sort of fiber done properly. 
But the point of getting beyond sounds and marks to structures and procedures is to 
be able to say someth:i.ng about an object language as a system of authorized 
structures and procedures. Plato knows perfectly well how to talk about sounds and 
shapes. And, in Philel;>us,
21 
he ob vio�sly attaches great importance to Theuth's 
: discovery of. me.ans of: cla·ssifying vowels and consonants (no doilbt with a view to 
a combinatorial �rdering of them so as to get pattern into the vast variety of 
�ounds needed to get the linguist�c job �one). �ut this is just the classifying of 
sounds and sound-sequences, obviously something of help to the name-giver, but only 
16 
a necessary feature for the embodiment of name-forms. The really important 
matte'r is that the embod'i��t;· �s .propensities \aria' d:i:$P<>sition's embddy or be . ' 
, •.'· 
structured by the name for� 'cinci thus be pos�ible: instrumentalities for· 
... . ,i· !. 
"carvi ng nature at its joints•i � 
ll . · In an earli�r secti� of .this paper I �rtt�c;me<:t,,.th� P'?,SSibility of sorooone' s 
h ' . .. . ,. '' ; · '. _. . t"j, 
.being .. abl� to use �xpress�ons ,of the fo�m, 'The .. ! Itsel.f ' , signif�c::an tly without , 
' , I .� .. '• ' 
b;y 1:hat· v�ry. fact,. being abl.� �o say wl\at it is to be.!· I thi,nk we are now in ' .. ' ., . ;, . 
. . 
· a:.posit:ion,; �o say how that might be pos�.ible and also how one might, by a . ' .. . . .. . . ' . •, 
·reflective ·\,\Se .of ��cauage,. find out whct:t: it,. is t() be !'..� 
.
. _
Any number of early 
and middle Platonic dialogues are instructive in �his. regard, involving , as 
. ·. •. . . 
they do, much discussed "What is X?" questions. 'What is justice?', 'What is 
the. pio�s?' ,· •wh.�t is are te (virtue)?'--the ·list: is ·well known· to ·thousand's of 
college sophomores. Still staying with. the :myth:·'.0£ "the name-giver,·., 'we ·may 
suppose that he has provided 'the linguistic resotirce·s for asking· ·such questions , 
... 
in particular, in Greek the ability to· link the :definite·article to a· subs·tantive 
(say, justice) or an ·adject'i:ve· (say, pious) both in 'questions arid in sentences 
expresstng .generality with abstract sirigular terms as subjects (as in 1The· 
triangle h as three sides ' ; :section 2. above). Of course, Socrates ' inte:dQcutors 
regularly profess ability to answer a iiWhat: is X" question and with equal 
.. : . 
regula� ity start �ff by 9iving or alluding.to examples of·x·or listing some 
.. kinds of.;!� . Socrates, commonly with. ironic refe.rence to their pretensions to 
. , .  ' . ' , ' . ' . · .  . 
k·nowledge, .
. �ges to get �hem somehow to grasp what sort of answer to the 
' . . f " I " 
. . . • " . ' ' .' : . . "' . · : 
.
. 
. . questiQn- migh� be relevan�, however i�f<?,��ect i'!=- may be. 
. ;i < .  
;""
. 
In Euthyphr� , Socrates even says to· Euthyphro that what heiwants, in asking 
"What i s. the piou� ?" is the eidos' or" the' ''ide�, .. 22' 'using the 'very :terms which 
Plato, iri late� di�'logues, · �s�s0.for· his. s�pa:raied.fornts' • . . Whethe'r or· riot this 
is good evidence for Pla�o�'s hold,ing the �ep�a:t� fo.ims' doctrine at the. time 
.. :. 
; ' · \ l .. '. •' ' ;.· 
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of writing Euthyphro does not concern me here. What is relevant for my purpose is 
Socrates' use of the terms in the effort to j ar Euthyphro out of standard object 
language use of te rms (e.g., ' Prosecuting my fathe r is , pious ' ) and into what I have 
. 
. 
been calling reflective use of language. I am also interested in the assumption, 
often stated, that Socrates ' interlocutors, properly .questioned, will be able to 
answer "What is _!?" questions and the profes sion of Socrates that he needs only the 
suffe rance of one person in reaching·agreement on an answer. At b ottom, I think, 
that assumption is based on the sound idea that someone who has learne d the 
language and can use it properly can be brought round to formulating some of. its 
rules. Almost inevitably , instead of stating a rule or rules in answer, there 
is resort, as it were, to the material mode of speech . But, of course , that is the 
way the question was formulated, namely, by 'What is The ! Itself?', with its 
p resupposition of making a reference to something, namely, The ! Itself • 
. ,. 
But, and again of course, Plato is no conventionalist (except for the sounds or 
_marks of language). What he--and, presumably Socrates--is loi:!>king for is the 
rationale for linguistic usage, the logos of it, if you please, not simply some 
conventional rules. To manage some articulate awareness of the logos is to attend 
to how we actually use words co rrectly for the purpose of getting to what structure 
there must be in the world to warrant that usage or those usages. Whether, as 
Aristotle testifies , the historical Socrates limited the scope of his inqui ries 
and did not think of that, warranting structure as "separated", whereas Plato did, 
makes no difference to the point that the inquiry proceeds by logistic means and 
involves what I have been call ing the "reflective" u�e of language. Though 
extremely importan t for many other purposes, it also makes no difference for the 
present purpose that Plato himself manifest ly moves from inquiry by dialogue 
between two persons to inquiry by collection �d division ( whic h, presumably, can 
be carried on all alone). The same resources are being tapped, namely, those 
provided by Cratylus' mythical name-giver . And, to save Plato the embarrassment of 
18 
. ' 
h�ving .tQ po�tu;i.ate a mythi�al ancestral know.-it-all, ·it might well be argued • 
.. . � 
.. . . . '· , l . ·:· , ' . . 
. that the. na�-give,r of Cratylus is simply a picturesque way of claiming that a 
.. . , . . ' 
_ language, developed and ,refined through c.enturies of varied and complex 
experience, will, when used "reflectively", yield to us the order and inter-
. . , . : . ' . , . . ', · , . ; . . . ' 
conneqtion of t he principles of J::>eing._ But this is speculation. 
. · . · ·  . 
12. Some co�cluding comnierit·s. · ·  I airi aware,· of course, that the Plato I have here 
'· 
depicted, manner of 
'
eXpression aside , bears resemblance to ·w. v. O'. Quine, 
Wilfrid Seliars � . and some other contemporaries, the.:. chief point ,·of reseritblance 
being that all of them' hold that we bring language ' or concepts to our encounter 
. . . :· l . .  . . . . • 
with the world·· and do not abstract or "read off" it or ·them from' sensations, 
"ideas", sense-data, or what have you. They-are rather mare eoriventionist than 
P.lato al,ld would be in differing ways uncomfortable with the Platonic insistence 
.that, in unearthing.conceptual nec essities ��a dialectic, one
.
gets at the 
ordering principles of the world. The Platonic tradition , with the idea that 
the same �rincipl es which order the world inform the human soul in its encounter 
with the world, has be�n rich,. varied, and attractive . Thinking of it I am less 
alarmed at a possU>le charge of reading Sellars and Quine into Plato. 
- , Does this reading make Plato a "linguis.tic philosopher"? I :thihk hot'. -_'It 
leaves -�lenty of rcioin f�r Plato's· doctrine of 't!le aC::i'tive soui, ·for!the �soul's 
. . . ,·,e;�t.f-C: attachinent to .the 'forms·� ani:i even for.his' theory of •p<):etic 'inspiration. 
'�d,1much;rnore;· What it does. at least atteitpt to nail down is th.e·distin·ction 
.t." '
" 
bei��en' 'd6�. and epist�me and "the sc>tt of disc"iplined inquiry' which' leads to 
. I . . . the ·latter arid makes it worth 'J:iavirtg • 
. '{1, 
. ".t . .  , " ; • ·: i 
' J. 
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